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I
INTRODUCTION
Chandler urges affirmance of the district court's order and judgment on three grounds.
First, he says the Court should interpret Idaho Code section 45-508 to give his mechanics' liens
priority because Idaho's mechanic's lien statutes create two lien classes-mechanics'
"all other types of liens"-and

liens and

are intended to give the former priority over the latter.

(Respondent's Brief (RB) 19-25.) Second, Chandler contends that Idaho and Utah case law
supports this two-class interpretation. (RB 25-29.) And third, Chandler says he purportedly
withdrew his lien claim over Lot 2 such that the claim was no longer over "two or more
buildings" within the meaning of section 45-508. Thus, according to Chandler, the statute no
longer applied and he was excused from failing to designate the amounts owed on each building.
(RB 29-33.) None of these arguments hits the mark.
Chandler attempts to justify his claim that section 45-508 creates two classes of liens by
repeating the district court's reasoning. But as Robertson Stephens explained at length in its
opening brief, that reasoning fell short in several fundamental respects. (Appellant's Opening
Brief (AOB) 21-32.)

Under Chandler's view, a mechanic's lien that, as required, fails to

designate the amounts owed on two or more properties should be enforced at the expense of
unsuspecting third parties who are entitled to know the amount the lien claims against each
property. Not only does such a reading run afoul of section 45-508's plain language, it also
upsets the policy balance the statute embodies-a

balance that protects both mechanics' lien

claimants and unsuspecting third parties by postponing rather than invalidating deficient

mechanics' liens. And as Robertson Stephens also explained [AOB 28-32], none of the Idaho or
Utah cases Chandler cites supports his view because the cases do not address section 45-508 or
the policies behind that statute.
Nor could Chandler escape the consequences of section 45-508 by purporting to
withdraw his lien on Lot 2, which Chandler claims, "due to [his] inadvertence," included work
not properly subject to a mechanic's lien. (RB 29-33.) The time to amend Chandler's lien
claims expired a year and a half before he purported to withdraw the claim, however, and Idaho
law does not permit belated attempts to amend-much

less amendments like Chandler's, sought

while the parties were deep in litigation over the lien. Further, Chandler has cited no legal
support for his "inadvertence" excuse-an

excuse the record refutes-and

on that ground alone

the Court should reject it. Plus, if the Court were to accept that excuse, a laborer owed money on
several properties could record any number of liens against the properties, wait to see which ones
will provide the greatest recovery, and then simply withdraw those that don't work to his or her
advantage. To countenance such a rule would frustrate the goal of providing the public with
accurate notice of liens. It would also invite the recording of overbroad, deficient, or even
fraudulent liens to maximize a lien claimant's chances of recovery.
In the end, Chandler asks this Court to uphold his lien even though he indisputably failed
to meet the designation requirement of section 45-508. He makes that request, of course, at the
expense of Robertson Stephens, which complied with its lien recording obligations in all
respects. It is hardly equitable to punish Robertson Stephens for Chandler's mistake, particularly
since Robertson Stephens has recouped only $270,000 of the $28.7 million it is owed, while

Chandler has received $5.2 million of the $6.7 million he is owed. For these reasons, this Court
should reverse the judgment.

I1
ARGUMENT
A.

Chandler's Reading Of Section 45-508 Advances A One-Sided View Of The
Legislative Intent Behind The Statute.
Like the district court, Chandler posits that this Court should read section 45-508 in light

of the Legislature's purported intent to create two classes of liens-mechanics'
other liens-and

liens and all

to give mechanics' liens priority. Thus, Chandler concludes, the fact that his

lien did not designate the amounts owed to him on each of the Haydens' properties makes his
lien subordinate only to other mechanics' liens-but

still superior to Robertson Stephens' lien.

Moreover, Chandler contends that Robertson Stephens' contrary interpretation is "absurd"
because it means "the legislature intended to punish laborers only in one very specific situation
in which third parties are given inaccurate notice of the amount of the lien claim." (RB 22.)
Chandler is wrong on all counts.
For starters, Chandler takes a lopsided view of the legislative purpose behind the
mechanic's lien statutes. Granted, as Chandler notes, one such purpose is to protect a laborer
whose work improves a property's value. The statutes do so by placing mechanics' liens on
equal footing with each other as far as priorities go and by generally giving the mechanics' liens
preferred status over other liens. See

9 45-506 (mechanics'

liens "shall be on equal footing with

those liens within the same class of liens, without reference to the date of the filing of the lien

claim or claims and are preferred to any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance, which may have
attached subsequent" to when the laborer's work commenced). But at the same time, section 45508 balances the goal of protecting a mechanic's lien claimant with the equally important goal of
protecting third parties whose interests in liened properties would be affected by a mechanic's
lien. (See AOB 24-27 and authorities cited.) When a mechanic's lien fails to designate between
properties, the statute strikes this balance by postponing the lien rather than invalidating it
altogether. (See id.)
Viewed in this light, Robertson Stephens' interpretation of section 45-508 is more
sensible than Chandler's because it harmonizes the interests of unsuspecting third parties who
properly perfect their liens and laborers who improperly fail to apprise those third parties about
amounts owed on each of two or more properties. Conversely, Chandler's interpretation goes
too far because it gives a deficient mechanic's lien superiority at the expense of interested third
parties who are entitled to proper lien notice. Chandler's one-sided view does nothing to further
the purpose of the lien statutes or "to promote justice"-the

overarching principle that governs

all statutes. See Phillips v. Salmon River Min. & Dev. Co., 72 P . 886 (1903) ("All of the
provisions of our mechanic's and laborer's lien law, as well as all other statutes, must be liberally
construed with a view to effect their objects and to promote justice.").
Even if the Legislature intended to distinguish between two lien classes in other
mechanics' lien statutes, a straightforward reading of section 45-508 shows that the two-class
notion did not cany over to that statute. (See AOB 22-24 and authorities cited.) Section 45-508
states that lien claimants who fail to "designate the amount due" on each of two or more

buildings owned by the same person will have their liens "postponed to other liens." The statute
does not qualify the phrase "other liens," does not define that phrase to mean "liens of the same
class," and does not suggest that the phrase is limited to mechanics' liens. Indeed, if a two-class
lien structure applied in the circumstances that section 45-508 contemplates, why doesn't the
1

statute make the same distinction between lien classes as section 45-506 purportedly does? The
answer is that section 45-508 draws no such distinction, but instead broadly gives "other liens"
superiority over mechanics' liens in one discrete situation: when a laborer records a single lien
against two or more properties and fails to designate the amounts owed on each. And the statute
gives other liens such superiority while not invalidating the mechanics' liens. This balances the
rights of third parties and laborers.
Chandler claims Robertson Stephens' interpretation "makes no sense because Idaho law
does not punish a laborer that works on several different properties and records separate liens
against each of the properties for the total amount due." (RB 22.) He also contends that Idaho
law does not "punish a laborer that records a single lien against multiple properties," but instead
"sets forth an incorrect designation of the amount owed on each." (Id.) Thus, he concludes,
Robertson Stephens' interpretation is "absurd" because it "punish[es] laborers in only one very
specific situation in which third parties are given inaccurate notice of the amount of the lien
claim." ( I d )
I

As noted, section 45-406 states: "The liens provided for in this chapter shall be on equal
footing with those liens within the same class of liens, without reference to the date of the filing
of the lien claim or claims and are preferred to any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance . . . ."

Chandler misses the point.

For starters, Chandler's lien did not suffer from mere

"inaccurate notice." Rather, his lien gave no notice about the extent to which his lien claims
covered each Lot, as section 45-508 required. Thus, there is nothing "absurd" about enforcing
section 45-508's penalty provision in the face of Chandler's failure to comply with the statute.
By the same token, there is nothing absurd about "not punishing" a laborer who either (a) records
individual liens against multiple properties or (b) designates the incorrect amount owed on two
or more properties under the statute. That is because-unlike

Chandler-the

laborer has

provided at least a minimum level of notice about the extent of the lien claim over each property.
Finally, Chandler's attempts to distinguish Robertson Stephens' cited legal authorities
can quickly be dispatched. For instance, Chandler claims Board v. Freedman 131 A. 913 (N.J.
Err. & App. 1926), is inapplicable because under New Jersey Statute 2A:44A-ZI(a), "New
Jersey prefers the ability to transfer real estate over the rights of laborers." (RB 23.) But that
statute is irrelevant, since it took effect in 1994-almost

70 years afler Board was decided. The

fact remains that Board supports Robertson Stephens' position because it held a mortgage to be
superior over a mechanic's lien that failed to designate between amounts owed on several
2

properties, under a rule nearly identical to section 45-508. Id at 914.

Chandler also broadly asserts that Robertson Stephens' other cited cases do not assist in
interpreting section 45-508, because none held a mechanic's lien that failed to designate the
2

At the time, New Jersey's postponement provision was apparently a product of case law, not
statute. It read: "[A] claim filed upon separate buildings and upon distinct lots of land, without
apportioning the claim and designating specifically the amount claimed upon each must be
postponed to the claim of other incumbrances." Board, 131 A. at 914.

amounts owed on two properties is postponed to non-mechanics' liens. (RB 23-24.) Ignoring
that Board did hold exactly that [see AOB 23-24], Chandler misses the point of the other cases.
They show that in choosing to postpone mechanics' liens that fail to designate the amounts owed
on two or more properties, Idaho has not followed the same absolutist approach that other states,
which invalidate such liens, have taken. Thus, the cases provide helphl context in explaining
how, in enacting section 45-508, the Idaho Legislature, unlike other states, intended to balance
between protecting a mechanic's lien claimant who improves the property and protecting
unsuspecting third parties who are entitled to notice about the extent of any mechanic's lien on
the property. (Id.) Those cases cannot, therefore, be so casually dismissed, as Chandler urges.

B.

The Idaho and Utah Cases Chandler Cites Do Not Factor Into The Court's
Calculus.
Like the district court, Chandler contends that White v. Constitution Mining Co., 56 Idaho

403, 55 P.2d 152 (1936), and Eccles Lumber Co. v. Martin, 87 P. 713 (Utah 1906), and its
progeny support his reading of section 45-508. But as Robertson Stephens explained at length
[AOB 28-32], none of those cases bears on the analysis here.
Robertson Stephens will not repeat the entirety of its discussion here. Suffice it to say
that in White, the Court was confronted with multiple mining claims that were "all in one unit"
[55 P.2d at 1591 such that the mechanics' liens were not against "two or more" mines or mining
claims, which would otherwise have triggered the designation obligation in section 45-508. It is
wrong to claim, as Chandler does, that White is of some assistance here when it never
discussed--or even had reason to discuss-section

45-508 or the policies behind that statute.

Consequently, White at most stands for the proposition that an overly broad lien description does
not automatically invalidate a mechanic's lien. (See AOB 29-30.)
Neither Eccles nor its progeny bear on this Court's analysis either. Although those cases
used the phrase "lien claimants of the same class" while discussing Utah's postponement
provision, the courts' use of that phrase does not justify Chandler's "two-class" construction of
section 45-508 because the meaning of that phrase is far from clear. None of the cases explain
what "lien claimants of the same class" means nor was that language germane to the holding in
those cases-that

the failure to designate did not invalidate the mechanic's lien. (See AOB 30-

32.)
In short, none of Chandler's cited cases factors into the interpretation of section 45-508,
much less supports Chandler's interpretation.
C.

Chandler's Attempt To Escape The Consequences Of Section 45-508 By Having
Purported To "Withdraw" His Lien Against Lot 2 Draws No Support From The
Record, The Law, Or The Equities.
Chandler is wrong to argue that he could avoid postponement of his deficient lien under

section 45-508 simply by withdrawing his claim against Lot 2. (RB 29-33.)
To begin with, the record refutes Chandler's contention that this was a case where
Chandler's mere "inadvertence" led to the inclusion of "too much land" and "$20,000 too much"
in his lien. (RB 30-32.) In fact, between November 2003 and April 2004, Chandler recorded
three separate liens against Lots 1 and 2-all

three of which covered Lot 2. (R., Ex. 9, at Exs.

19-21.) Chandler's final (Second Amended) lien-recorded

by a different set of lawyers than his

first two liens---even increased the amount of money he sought to recover against Lot 2, from
$20,451.80 to $23,770.70. He then sued to foreclose his liens against both Lots. (R., Vol I., 5766.) Under the circumstances, it is hard to see anything "inadvertent" about Chandler's inclusion
of Lot 2 debt in his liens.
Further, while Chandler admits that the Lot 2 amount consisted of non-lienable work [RB
29-30], he does so only to avoid the consequences of section 45-508. Chandler cites no authority
that permits such a drastic and belated revision to his lien claims, much less a revision that
allows him to escape the consequences of his undisputed failure to designate under section 45508. This is not surprising, since under Idaho law, "a defective claim of lien may not be
amended after the statutory period for filing the claim [i.e., 90 days] has expired." Ross v. Olson,
95 Idaho 915, 918 (1974) (contractor precluded from amending mechanics' lien during trial to
correct the fact the property description contained no porlion of the improvement the contractor
had built); c$ Harrogate Constr. Co. v. Joseph Haas Co., 250 A.2d 376, 379 (Del. Super. Ct.
1969) (under similar Delaware mechanic's lien statute, contractor was time-barred from
amending lien to designate amounts due on each structure).
To permit Chandler to withdraw his lien under the circumstances would set an unwise
precedent and be unfair.

Under Chandler's reasoning, a laborer owed money on several

properties could record any number of liens against the properties, wait until the parties are in
litigation to see which lien or liens assure the most recovery, and then simply withdraw those
that do not work to his or her advantage. At best, such a result would deprive interested third
parties of accurate notice of the extent of any mechanics' liens that encumber the subject

properties. At worst, that result would invite the recording of fraudulent mechanics' liens-such
as a lien that includes amounts for work unrecoverable under the mechanic's lien scheme-with
the goal of maximizing the mechanic's lien claimant's chances of recovery. And in all events,
permitting mechanics' liens to maintain priority over all other liens under these circumstances
would inject additional unease into an already tightening credit market. That, in turn, would
make it more difficult and expensive, if not impossible, for consumers to obtain bank credit for
the purchase or construction of homes.
Finally, the equities do not favor permitting Chandler to withdraw his Lot 2 lien. It is
undisputed that Robertson Stephens did everything required to protect its position under the lien
recording statutes. It is likewise undisputed that Chandler's liens failed to comply with the
designation requirements under section 45-508. Under the circumstances, it would be unfair to
allow Chandler to withdraw his lien claim in the middle of litigation, thus excepting his liens
from section 45-508's requirements and excusing his noncompliance, yet leave Robertson
Stephens-which

did nothing wrong-to

suffer the consequences. And to the extent Chandler

tries to portray himself as David against Robertson Stephens' Goliath [see RE3 21, recall that
Chandler was paid $5.2 million of the $6.7 million the Haydens originally owed him. By
contrast, Robertson Stephens is owed $28.7 million but has recouped only around $270,000-an
amount Robertson Stephens was able to obtain only through protracted litigation with the
Haydens. Thus, the equities hardly tip decidedly in Chandler's favor.

111
CONCLUSION
The arguments in Chandler's respondent's brief are unpersuasive and lack support. They
present no harrier to this Court's enforcement of section 45-508's plain language. Accordingly,
the Court should reverse the judgment.
DATED: October 9,2007.
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